Four theories proposing determinate relations of actual causation for Boolean networks are described and applied to 16 cases. All four theories are founded on the idea that actual causation is based on results that appropriate experimental interventions would produce. They differ in their accounts of the relevant kinds of experimental interventions. The more complex theories are motivated by treating Boolean networks as idealizations of noisy gates and by Patricia Cheng's work on human causal judgement.
1.
One set of questions about causation concerns how to discover a correct causal mechanism to explain of a distribution of events. Quite another set of questions concerns whether one particular event caused another, or prevented another. The latter are questions of actual causation. Generally, actually causation has little if any bearing on predictions of phenomena, but it does bear on issues of responsibility, and so of morality and law and historical explanation.
Absent some detailed specification of the structures of situations in which causation and prevention are to be assessed, trying to say anything general and informative about the conditions under which one event actually causes or prevents another seems a fool's task. Event E may be potentially caused by events B or C, for example, and all three may occur, but unless we know details of the mechanism we should be reluctant to judge whether B is the cause, or C, or both or something else. The causal connection between events of type B and C and events of type E might be stochastic; B might interrupt the mechanism by which C would otherwise cause E, or C might do that for B. The mechanism by which B produces E might be faster than the mechanism by which C produces E, and so on. For judgments of actual causation, we need details.
Even details are not enough. Our judgements of what caused with in a specific situation, with well understood potential causal relations and mechanisms, surely depend on factors of different kinds. Some of those factors are "structural" or "formal" and have nothing to do with the nature of the particular features involved, but only with how their presence or absence influences, or could influence, one another. Other factors have to do with the usual intentions motivating a kind of action, or with how normal or abnormal a condition is, or with combinations of causal and moral attributions. If we are told a causal story in which a poison is administered, or an antidote, we infer intentions, and those inferences affect our judgements of actual causation. If an untoward event (a boulder falling) causes another (ducking the boulder) which causes a third (survival), we may be reluctant to call the first event a cause of the third, because the third is the normal case, what would have happened in the normal course of things.
The first principle in science is to separate the variables in a problem, to break it into solvable pieces. So let it be with philosophy. The causal judgements that are independent of context should be determinable from relationships of unnamed variables or events, without cover stories about assassins and antidotes and so on. It may be that without such cover stories some, perhaps many, judgements are equivocal, varying from person to person, or simply uncertain for any one of us. If so, we need to understand the varieties, and the possible consistent principles, no one of which may account for all of the varying intuitions. It may be, of course, that some structural principles largely covary with judgements that involve other features, such as ordinary intentions, but that is insufficient reason for lumping them together without first studying the possible structural principles.
Despite the interest and enormous ingenuity of the stories fitted over structures, we should leave them aside until we have better understood the possible causal properties of anonymous structures. Of course, once the plausible structural possibilities and alternatives are clarified, one should want to know how they combine and interact with informal features of situations to yield causal judgements, and whether those interactions and combinations obey any clear principles.
David Lewis introduced a simple class of examples in which, all variables are binary, 1 representing an occurrence, 0 an absence of an event of a type; and the dependencies among variables are all of the form:
(1) E = (A1 + …+An) * (1 -B1)*…*(1 -Bk) = df . fe (A1,…,An; B1,…,Bk) where A1..An, B1…Bk are all parents (respectively "positive" and "negative") of E and the plus is (and is throughout this paper) Boolean addition. Lewis discussed such systems as "neuron diagrams" represented pictorially but formally equivalent to systems of equations of form (1) above, but with the intuitive caveat that the diagram and associated equations represent a complete description of the causal system. Circles are Boolean variables, their values are 1 (dark) or zero (light), and each variable X is a function of its parents, with a parent in the role of an A in the formula above if the edge from it to X is marked -> and in the role of a B above if the edge from it to X is marked Instead of restricting dependencies to the form (1), following Halpern and Pearl (1999) , we can allow that in networks of binary variables, a variable may be any Boolean function of its parents M The nodes without any edges directed into them are zero-indegree variables. these cases implicitly assume a standard alternative state from which the actual state was realized-most plausibly, the alternative state in which every zero-indegree variable with actual value 1 has alternative value 0, and every zero-indegree variable with actual value 0 has value 0. But when we consider arbitrary Boolean functions, even that alternative can yield unintuitive results, for example if an event is actually absent and its absence is sufficient for the occurrence of an effect for which an actually occurring event is also sufficient.
Perhaps the question should be: did, or could, the state of the system come about in such a way that the X taking on its value caused E to take on its value? A little more precisely:
given a state Sa in which E has value Ea and variable X has value Xa, and another system state, Salt, consistent with the laws of the system, in which the value of X is Xalt and the value of E is Ealt, if the system state changes from Salt to Sa, is the change in the value of X is a cause of the change in the value of E? Of course, if in changes from some alternative system states to the actual state, but not from others, the change in X causes the change in E, we can put probabilities over the alternative system states and judge the probability that a change in X caused a change in E. Conceivably, that is one source of our uncertainty about actual causation in practical circumstances. Whichever question we ask, we must still find criteria-an algorithm-for saying when a change in X from Xalt to Xa is a cause of a change in E from Ealt to Ea. There are, besides theories of actual causation that, whatever the tacit considerations of their authors, appear to have few motivating principles other than to include various cases and to exclude others. Very technical proposals of Halpern and Pearl (2002) , and of Pearl (2000) Some theories of actual causation impose constraints on any acceptable algorithm or analysis, while not actually providing an algorithm. For example, it may be required that actual causation be transitive, or that absences not be causes, or that complete absences of every event considered not be a cause of any of these absences, or that the prevention of the prevention of an occurring event is a cause of that occurrence, and so on. Various cases may give one doubts about some of these principles. In Figure 6 , for example, the occurrence of A seems undoubtedly an actual cause of the occurrence of C. C in turn prevents the occurrence of an event D, which would otherwise occur and which, if it occurred, would prevent the occurrence of E. We are inclined to say that the occurrence of C prevents the prevention of the occurrence of E, and so is an actual cause of the occurrence of E. But E's occurrence is indifferent to whether or not A occurs, and one is tempted, contrary to transitivity, to deny that the occurrence of A causes the occurrence of E. But the differing intuitions about transitivity need not stop progress: whatever analysis is proposed, champions of transitivity can always take the transitive closure of the proposed relation of actual causation. A general refusal to allow absences as causes is more debilitating. It can be motivated by slippery slopes-a lot of stuff doesn't happen that would prevent some effect-but there is no slope evident in the simple Boolean mechanisms.
3.
We suggest that the criteria we apply for judging actual causation in neuron diagrams and Boolean diagrams are loosely formed around requirements for causal inference in But of course more is required for the actual value of X, Xa, to cause the actual value of E, Ea. In particular, it seems necessary that in some such experiment X and E take their actual values, either before or after the intervention on X. To avoid suggesting that this is a final analysis, we will call an actual value of any variable X meeting these conditions for actual causation of the actual value of E a candidate actual cause of the value of E. More succinctly, the proposal is
D1. An event (or non-event) C = c in a Boolean network in a state S, in which the value of C is c and the value of E is e, is an candidate actual cause of another event (or non-event) E = e if and only if there is some setting of the zero indegree variables such that, for that setting, (1) the value of E is e and the value of C is c, and for at least one directed path p from C to E all nodes on that path have their actual values, and (2) an intervention that changes the value of C changes the value of all nodes on p and hence changes the value of E.
For most cases, the set of candidate actual causes is reasonable. Below each figure we give the candidate actual causes of the value of E. Obviously, when there is only one directed path from C to E, D1 and D2 will agree as to whether the actual value of C is a candidate actual cause of the actual value of E. D2 allows transitivities that D1 prohibits, and admits ineffectual actual causes. Thus by D2, D2 is not, however, transitive in general. There is no experiment in the sense of E1 that witnesses the edge from A to D, and yet figure 6a is only a less informative description of the same mechanism in figure 6. E2 permits us to clamp C in figure 6a , and so demonstrate that A is a potential cause of D.
We could suppose that any edge X -> Z in a diagram can be decomposed into a path X -> There is, however, a more limited and less contextual way of modifying a given diagram and equations, namely by assuming the Boolean equations are deterministic approximations of non-deterministic dependencies. We considered two senses of experiment, both of which had consequences for figure 12, excluding A and B as potential causes of E, and allowing only C = 1 as an actual cause of E = 1. But perhaps we should think of an experiment to test whether A can influence E as more disruptive of the structure: In figure 12 , we can set the zero-indegree variable C to zero, but only for E.
The value of C for B and D is left at 1. We are essentially changing the equations of the structure for the variables (except for E) on a pathway from A to E so that each variable in the pathway depends only on the mechanism that descends from A. By doing so, we let that mechanism operate, and E varies as A, B and D vary. That implies a different sense of experiment:
E3. An experiment to test whether X can influence Y in a system consists of an assignment of values to the zero-indegree variables and, in accord with the This third sense of experiment may seem contrived, but it connects with a substantial body of work in computer science and in psychology. A common network in computer science involves "noisy gates" (Pearl, 1988) . A noisy-or gate, for example, is given by the Boolean equation E = qaA + qbB. The quantities qa and qb are parameters taking 0, 1 as values. A joint probability distribution is defined over the variables and parameters, generally requiring the parameters to be independent in probability of each other and of the values of A and of B. Thus, values of A and B need not determine a value of E, but only assign it a (conditional) probability. Cheng (1997) has used noisy gates as a model of human causal judgement (Glymour, 2002) . In essence, she treats the probability that qa = 1 in the above equation as the probability that, given that A occurs, A causes E to occur. On this model, such probabilities of parameter values, or "causal powers," can be estimated from observed frequencies of E, A and B. She gives evidence that in appropriate circumstances adult judgements of causal strength accord qualitatively with such a model.
Conjecture for the moment that our judgements of actual causation are tacitly based on a model of causation like Cheng's, and even in cases we are told are deterministic, we merely set the causal powers to some value very close to, but not quite equal to, 1. If that were so, then something like the second sense of experiment above would be appropriate for our judgements of whether X can possibly cause Y.
So we have this rather more complex alternative account of actual causation: Clauses (iii) and (iv) are implicitly inductive and make use of the acyclicity of the diagrams. One worry is that D3 is just too complex to be plausible; another is that it may be too liberal. In figure 12 not. According to D1 or D2, however, it most certainly is. One inclination (rather less than a conviction), is that sometimes groups or aggregates rather than individuals are causes of an effect; one can be a member of a group, or a component of an aggregate, and in some contexts thereby carry moral responsibility for group effects, without one's actions causing the group effects.
Multiple valued variables immediately carry us outside of Boolean equations, with attendant complexities. Because transitivity fails for causal relations among multi-valued variables further ambiguities, or at least uncertainties are created for actual causation.
The actual value of B can depend on the actual value of A, and the actual value of C can depend on the actual value of B, but even with only a single pathway from A to C, variations in A can result in no changes in C. We do not preclude the development of plausible proposals for actual causation with non-Boolean dependencies or for multiple valued variables, but we have none to offer.
8.
The disturbing thing about actual causation is that, while in many practical matters judgements of actual causation may have important influences on human action and human fate, even in well-posed classes of problems there seems no clear fact of the matter, only intuitions that may vary considerably from person to person. Even if the principles of any of the four accounts sketched above were tacitly embraced, the complexity of the reasoning their application requires would in many cases prevent unaided human judgements from according with them. It is unfortunate that, so far as we know, with the single exception of a related paper by Sloman and Lagnado (2002) , there is no psychological literature on how variable these judgements may be. The several caveats in this paper argue that unless the settings of psychological experiments are very carefully posed, variations in judgement can be expected because of ambiguities in the problem. But in view of the complexity considerations, and evidence that people do not treat occurrences and non-occurrences at all symmetrically (Cheng, 1997) , I doubt that even in problems in which the mechanisms are unambiguously and thoroughly understood, human judgements will generally conform to any of these accounts. The apparently unanswerable question is whether they should.
